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1.  Introduction 
 
The collapses of numerous banks and the losses incurred by others in the recent global 
financial crisis has, once again, brought banks’ lending practices to the forefront of 
political and academic debate.   Many causes have been proposed to explain the crisis 
and subsequent turmoil but at the centre of these proposals has been the notion that 
there has been a fundamental change in the banks’ business model. In essence, this 
change has been characterised by a move away from traditional financial 
intermediation towards financial disintermediation.  It has manifested itself in the 
relative decline in the importance of bank deposits as sources of funds and the 
increase in importance of public debt markets as major providers of finance for large 
corporations.  Throughout this transformation banks have endeavoured to remain 
competitive, but many commentators have argued that in doing so they have drifted 
away from their main role of delegated monitors.   
 
One instrument that allowed such change is syndicated bank loans which involve a 
group of banks lending together to a single borrower on common terms.  For some 
banks it is an alternative to traditional bilateral lending.  Syndicated loans are not new 
and were considered as an innovation when they first emerged in the 1970s as a way 
of providing large scale loans to sovereign borrowers. Over the past forty odd years or 
so the market has ebbed and flowed but the last decade has witnessed a revival and 
has evolved substantially to provide an alternative to public borrowing for larger 
corporations. As such, syndicated loans provided the banks with an opportunity to 
compete with public debt markets in the provision of large scale finance to large 
borrowers.  
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Syndicated lending does not necessarily correspond to what makes banks “special”.  
For example, the literature on financial intermediation emphasises banks 
distinctiveness, compared to providers of direct finance, as their uniqueness in 
producing and transferring information and their capacity to mitigate asymmetric 
information through the bilateral banker-customer relationship (Diamond, 1984, 1991 
and Allen, 1990)1.  In essence, close banker-customer relationships are highly 
conducive to the banks’ efforts to reduce risk, compete more effectively with direct 
finance markets, create value for borrowers and lenders, and increase net income2.  
From this perspective, syndicated lending is substantially different from the 
traditional bank-customer orientation associated with bilateral loans.  Specifically, the 
delegation of responsibility and control by participant banks to arranger banks 
ostensibly detracts from the banker customer relationship and potentially undermines 
the creation of value.   
 
                                                 
1The close and unique relationship between banks and borrowers creates benefits such as sharing 
sensitive information (Bhattacharya and Chiesa, 1995); reducing information asymmetries (Petersen 
and Rajan, 1994; and Berger and Udell, 1995); monitoring collateral more effectively (Rajan and 
Winton, 1995); and, adopting a strategy in the pricing of loans in the long term (Berlin and Mester, 
1999). 
2Lummer and McConnell (1989); Billet et al. (1995) and Preece and Mullineaux (1996) have 
investigated the signalling effect of borrowing through syndicated lending markets.   They provide 
evidence that capital markets react positively to the announcement of syndicated financing and 
abnormal returns are observed in a firm’s equity.  These empirical findings support the arguments of 
the theoretical literature in banking (see Diamond, 1984, 1991 and Allen, 1990) on the uniqueness of 
bank in producing and transferring information.   
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In a syndicated loan arranger bank(s) are at the core of the syndication arrangement. 
Participant banks are less active than arrangers in negotiating the loan terms.  During 
the life of the loan they have an “arm’s-length” relationship with the borrower and act 
through the arranger or agent bank (Simons, 1993 and Sufi, 2007).  Hence, participant 
banks rely substantially on arranger banks both before and after the loan issuance. 
Prior to issuance, participant banks depend on the arranger to evaluate the credit 
quality of the borrower.  After issuance the monitoring of the loan and the relationship 
with the debtor is often delegated to the arranger banks. Accordingly, the nature of the 
participant banks role and their relationship with the borrower would appear to be 
substantially different compared to bilateral loans. 
 
Against this background we investigate the choice of syndicated lending over bilateral 
lending by participant banks.  In particular, we examine the relationship between the 
financial features of participant banks and the share of syndicated loans in their 
portfolios.  As outlined above, this is an important question because banks are 
generally regarded as creating value through the explicit banker-customer relationship 
associated with bilateral lending.  Furthermore, there is a gap in the extant literature 
on the motives of participant banks for becoming involved in syndicated lending.   
Apart from Altunbaş and Kara (2011), the main focus tends to be on arrangers rather 
than participant banks (see Pavel and Phillis, 1987; Simons, 1993; Pennachi, 1998; 
Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000; Panyagometh and Roberts, 2002; and Altunbaş et al., 
2005)3.  Accordingly, the literature highlights regulatory capital, liquidity constraints, 
                                                 
3 Previous studies have also focused on the role of the arranger, their reputation, and possible 
asymmetric information problems (such as Lee and Mullineux 2001 and Panyagometh and Roberts 
2002) and the pricing of syndicated loans in relation to borrower financial characteristics and loan 
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portfolio diversification, increasing net interest margins and fee income as the main 
factors effecting the syndication decision.   
 
In this paper we extend the literature in several ways.  Firstly, our focus is on 
participant banks that need to make the decision between close-relationship bilateral 
loans and “arms-length” syndicated loans.  Secondly, unlike earlier studies which 
examine the participation decision only, we calculate the share of the syndicated loans 
in banks’ loan portfolios and account for the size of lending in relation to banks 
financial conditions.  Thirdly, we study a period between 2000 and 2010 in which the 
debt and corporate borrowing markets in Europe expanded exponentially until 2007 
and subsequently were affected by the global financial crisis.  Crucially, the 
determinants of syndicated lending during the economic expansion and the impact of 
the financial crisis on banks’ choices as to whether or not to make syndicated loans 
has received little or no academic attention.   
 
Finally, we look at European banks which are rarely studied in this context.  The 
decision to make syndicated loans is more complicated for European banks since 
Europe has essentially been a bank-orientated system, as opposed to the United States, 
which is more orientated to capital markets.  In fact, European banks are less likely to 
engage in syndicated lending compared to U.S banks and banks from emerging 
markets (Gadanecz et al., 2006).    Furthermore, the period under analysis is 
significant as European banking has witnessed important changes in the form of 
consolidation and internationalisation after the introduction of the euro in 1999, and 
                                                                                                                                            
terms (such Coleman et al., 2002; Hubbard et al., 2002; Angboza et al., 1998 and Yi and Mullineaux, 
2005).  
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the introduction of new member states during 2004 and 2007 (Pisani-Ferry and Sapir, 
2010).  As syndicated loans are predominantly a cross-border lending mechanism, it is 
interesting to observe these changes through bank lending behaviour in this market.   
 
The data we utilise consists of 4,166 European banks of which 357 were active in the 
syndicated loan market between 2001 and 2010.  Using panel data estimation 
techniques, we examine the amount of funds allocated to syndicated lending and a 
range of bank-specific financial characteristics – such as size, liquidity and capital 
adequacy – that are likely to influence this decision.  The remainder of the paper is 
structured as follows:  The next section discusses the structure of syndicated loans and 
reviews the literature on costs and benefits to banks.  Section 3 introduces the 
methodology and data, and presents the descriptive statistics.  Section 4 presents the 
results and the final section concludes by summarising the main findings of the paper.   
 
2. Costs and benefits of syndicated lending: A literature review 
  
In a typical syndicated loan the arranger, who normally has an established relationship 
with the borrower, first meets the borrower to negotiate and discuss the broad terms of 
the loan.  Subsequently, the arranger will meet with the participants to discuss the 
details of the loan and establish the timetable and size of commitment for individual 
participants. In most cases arrangers retain part of the loan on their books with the 
remaining balance being provided by participants.  Once the sell-down has been 
completed, the arranger and all of the participants sign the loan agreement and the 
deal becomes active. The arrangement of the syndicated loan, which provides banks 
with a substantial source of fee income, is typically undertaken by large investment 
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banks. Participant banks, on the other hand, are usually geographically diverse and 
comprise smaller commercial banks with relatively less experience of international 
lending (Gadanecz et al, 2006).  They are not involved in the arrangement, 
negotiation and setting up of the syndication.  Moreover, once the loan has been 
issued and throughout its duration until maturity, the participant banks have no direct 
involvement with the borrower. Accordingly, once the loan has been successfully sold 
down, the arranger normally becomes the agent bank and acts on behalf the 
participants (Howcroft, 1998).  
 
Once the loan has been issued its subsequent monitoring and the relationship with the 
borrower are typically delegated to the arranger/agent bank. This is important because 
the monitoring function and the banker-customer relationship are generally regarded 
as methods for reducing borrower moral hazard. This consideration raises an 
additional type of moral hazard problem: as the arranger bears all of the costs 
associated with the monitoring of the loan, it might be disinclined to share all of the 
benefits of the relationship with participants (Bharath et al., 2010).  Several studies 
(Simons, 1993, Jones et al. 2005, Panyagometh and Roberts, 2002 and Sufi, 2007) 
have examined the arranger’s role and the associated moral hazard issues and 
opportunistic behaviour of arrangers. In broad terms these studies have found that 
arrangers do not exploit information advantages. In fact, the empirical evidence 
suggests that if the borrower is of low quality and requires high levels of monitoring, 
they have a tendency to keep larger shares of the loan4.  On a similar note, Gadanecz 
                                                 
4 Dennis and Mullineaux (2000), Lee and Mullineaux (2001) and Panyagometh and Roberts (2009) 
have also examined the influence of the arranger’s reputation on the success of a loan syndication. 
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et al. (2012) argue that some costs of syndicated lending from a participant bank’s 
perspective mainly stems from arranger participant relationship.  The fact that 
participant banks rely on the arranger to negotiate and deal with the borrower means 
that they depend on the arranger to evaluate the borrowers’ credit quality. Gadanecz et 
al. (2012) show that when participant banks have information inferiority in the 
syndicate, they require higher loan spreads to compensate for the asymmetry, 
especially, when the borrower is more opaque. 
 
These considerations raise the question that if participant banks are predominantly 
dependent on arrangers for value creation in syndicated lending, what are the benefits 
of syndicated lending? A number of studies have investigated the factors that 
determine the choice of syndicated lending (for example, Pavel and Phillis, 1987; 
Simons, 1993; Pennachi, 1998; Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000; Panyagometh and 
Roberts, 2002; Esty and Megginson, 2003; and Altunbas et al., 2005, Sufi, 2007).  
These studies suggest that syndicated loans can be used by banks to alleviate 
regulatory capital constraints5.  For smaller banks participation in a syndicated loan 
helps to develop new business and diversify their loan portfolio by extending credit to 
the sort of large borrowers that they would not normally do business with.   For larger 
banks more readily associated with arrangers, the syndication of a large loan is a 
method of risk management because it effectively spreads the risks of the loan over 
                                                                                                                                            
They find that a syndication is more likely to be successful with a larger loan amount and more 
participants when the arranger has a good reputation as an arranger in the market.   
5 From a pricing perspective Hubbard et al. (2002) investigate whether capital constrained banks 
charge higher yield spreads, and argue that the cost of borrowing from capital constrained banks will be 
higher than from well capitalized banks, particularly for borrowers facing substantial costs in switching 
to alternative bank lenders because of high information costs.   
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several lenders. As such, it decreases the lender’s exposure to a single borrower but 
simultaneously allows the lender to maintain an important relationship with the 
borrower.6 
 
Syndicated loans are an effective tool for portfolio diversification (Dennis and 
Mullineaux, 2001).  In this respect, they provide the opportunity for lenders to spread 
their risks more widely, both in geographic and sectoral terms, without exclusively 
using their own resources for monitoring and getting to understand the dynamics of a 
new economic environment.  Eichengreen and Mody (2000) and Simon (1993) argue 
that banks also have a tendency to engage in syndicated lending when they have 
excess liquidity.   
 
In bilateral lending the associated costs of having a banker customer relationship fall 
on the individual bank.  This consideration has led Armstrong (2003) to suggest that 
smaller participant banks may be motivated to enter into syndicated loans in order to 
economize on these costs.  Altunbas et al. (2005) and Jones et al. (2005) have argued 
that for larger credits, in particular, syndicated lending allows arranger banks to 
leverage the business on the basis of their brand name and worldwide 
expertise/reputation. Another consideration is that because syndicated loans are 
publically announced, they might be beneficial as a means of advertising the activities 
of banks in the financial markets.  This is important because having a presence in the 
                                                 
6 Syndicated lending also allows banks to compete more effectively with public debt markets for 
corporate loans (Jones et al., 2005).  The main business of banks, acting as intermediaries between 
fund suppliers and demanders, has being disrupted by firms choosing direct finance, such as 
commercial paper or bonds rather than bank loans.  Syndicated loans have been an attractive alternative 
for these financial products, and enable commercial banks to earn spread and fees from such business.   
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market and more importantly being seen to have a presence can be a key determinant 
of future business prospects (Howcroft and Solomon, 1985).   
 
As already mentioned, the vast majority of empirical studies on syndicated lending 
have examined it from the perspective of the arranger bank.  For example, Simons 
(1993) and Jones et al. (2005) focussed on the relationship between the arranger 
bank’s financial features and the share of the syndicated loan retained by these banks.  
Similarly, Dennis and Mullineaux (2000), Panyagometh and Roberts (2002), Lee and 
Mullineaux (2004), Altunbas et al. (2005), Sufi (2007)7 investigated the influence of 
loan terms and borrower credit quality on the arranger bank’s decision to arrange a 
syndicated loan and the share of the loan retained by the arranger afterwards8.  
Altunbas and Kara (2011) examined the motives of participant banks when joining 
syndications, however their study, due to data limitations, only examines the choice of 
syndicated lending and the data period correspond to 1990s.   
 
                                                 
7 Dennis and Mulliaux (2000) and Panyagometh and Roberts (2002) identify empirically the factors 
that influence an arranger bank’s decision to syndicate a loan and the determinants of the proportion of 
the loan sold in the event of syndication.  They utilize loan characteristics, arranger’s financial 
characteristics, variables related to the opacity of the borrower and information asymmetries as 
explanatory variables.  Altunbaş et al. (2005) employ arranger banks financial characteristics as the 
main determinants of arranger banks decision to syndicate loans.  In contrast, Pavel and Phillis (1987), 
Simons (1993) and Pennachi (1998) use share of the loans retained (or syndicated) by the arranger 
banks.   
8 Coleman et al. (2002) and Hubbard et al. (2000) also examine how the capital levels, loan portfolio 
quality, and liquidity ratios of senior banks influence pricing. 
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This paper, therefore, attempts to address some of the omissions in the extant 
literature.  Firstly, for the first time we utilise the share of syndicated loans in banks’ 
loan portfolios as a proxy to examine the behaviour of participant banks and the 
factors that determine their choice of syndicated lending.   Secondly, the data relates 
to quite a remarkable decade during which the international financial markets 
experienced unprecedented growth and contraction.  Thirdly, we focus on European 
banks during a period when financial market integration was encouraged in Europe.  
The next section describes the research methodology and discusses the data in more 
detail.   
 
3.  Methodology, data and descriptive statistics  
 
3.1 Model and variables 
 
In order to investigate the factors that influence and determine a banks involvement in 
syndicated lending, we ascertain the relative importance of syndicated lending within 
the loan portfolio for each bank. This was accomplished by comparing the amount of 
syndicated lending with the size of the total loan portfolio.  We then compare this 
relative measure of syndicated lending to a range of financial characteristics, such as, 
size of bank, capital constraints, loan portfolio quality, income diversification, cost 
efficiency and liquidity. These variables were identified from the extant literature and 
are regarded as important determinants of the allocation of funds by banks (see for 
example Altunbas et al., 2007 and Goddard et al., 2004).   
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Some banks do not regard syndicated lending as a viable business option or simply do 
not have access to the market. Accordingly, the sample was selected on the basis that 
it included only those banks that had joined loan syndicates and had access to the 
market.  Because we use banks which already have syndicated loans, there is a 
potential sample selection problem if the unobserved determinants of share of 
syndicated loans also affect banks’ syndicated loan participation.  To correct the 
selection bias we use Heckman’s two-step estimating procedure.  In the first step, 
prior to estimating the main model, the probit model shown below was used to 
estimate the probability of a bank participating in a syndicated loan or Synd.  Synd 
takes the value of 1 if a bank has participated in loan syndications within a given year 
and 0 otherwise.  This approach is analogous to earlier research by Dennis and 
Mullineaux (2000), Panyagometh and Roberts (2002), and Altunbaş et al. (2011).  
These studies employ a dummy dependent variable to model the factors shaping the 
choice of the syndication decision by arranger banks.  In the selection model a sample 
of 4,166 banks was used but only 357 had been involved in syndicated lending 
between 2000 and 2010.  The selection model is presented below in equation 1: 
 
 Pr	ሺܵݕ݊݀௜,௧ሻ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܤܽ݊݇	ݏ݅ݖ݁௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܲ݋ݎݐ݂݋݈݅݋	ݍݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܮ݅ݍݑ݅݀݅ݐݕ௜,௧ିଵ ൅
ߚସܵ݁ܿݑݎ݅ݐ݅ݏܽݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚହܮ݅ݏݐ݁݀௜,௧ ൅ ∑ ߚ௠ ൈ஼ିଵ௖ୀଵ ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ	݋݂	݋ݎ݅݃݅݊௖ ൅
∑ ߚ௡ ൈ௒ିଵ௬ୀଵ ܻ݁ܽݎ௬ ൅ ݁௜,௧                    (1) 
 
The variables are described below in detail.  We select four main variables, bank size, 
portfolio quality, liquidity and being active in the securitisation markets 
(securitisation), which may influence the decision of syndicated lending.  We assume 
that larger banks are more likely to invest elsewhere when their own market is 
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saturated and syndicated lending may be an alternative to expand.  Additionally, due 
to sizeable loan amounts in the syndicated loan market only relatively larger banks 
may take part.  A deteriorating loan portfolio quality may prompt banks to look at 
alternative lending practices and syndicated lending, due to higher quality borrowers 
in the market, may be an attractive option.  Liquidity is also a factor as liquid bank 
search for alternative assets.  Being active in the securitisation market shows the 
bank’s degree of integration with financial markets as well as the motivation to 
operate beyond “traditional banking” business model. In addition to the main 
variables, in the selection model we use Listed, to indicate whether a bank is listed on 
stock exchange.  We utilise Listed for identification in the selection equation.  We 
stipulate that being listed on a stock exchange is a signal of the ability to access the 
wider financial markets in general.  Finally, we use dummy variables to control for 
country of origin and year dummy variables to control for the macroeconomic 
environment.  
 
Subsequently, in step two the main model was estimated by adding the inverse of 
Mill’s ratio, which is derived from the probit estimate in (1).  The share of syndicated 
loans to total loans (Syndshare) was modelled as a function of the bank i’s financial 
characteristics for the fiscal year t-19.  This model estimates the impact of bank 
financial characteristics on the amount of syndicated loans after the bank’s initial 
decision to enter the market.  The model is shown in equation (2), as follows: 
                                                 
9 Ideally, one would like to have information from the bank’s monthly internal reporting system.  
However given the yearly frequency of publicly available balance sheet and profit/loss statement 
information, values at the end of the fiscal year preceding the loan participation decision are the most 
accurate measure one can use to gauge the interaction between bank characteristics and lending 
decisions. 
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ܵݕ݊݀ݏ݄ܽݎ݁௜,௧ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܤܽ݊݇	ݏ݅ݖ݁௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܥܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ	ܽ݀݁ݍݑܽܿݕ௜,௧ିଵ ൅
ߚଷܲ݋ݎݐ݂݋݈݅݋	ݍݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚସܮ݅ݍݑ݅݀݅ݐݕ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚହܰܫܯ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଺ܥ݋ݏݐ	݂݂݁݅ܿ݅݁݊ܿݕ௜,௧ିଵ ൅
ߚ଻ܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁	݀݅ݒ݁ݎݏ݂݅݅ܿܽݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଼ܵ݁ܿݑݎ݅ݏܽݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൅ 	ߚଽܫ݊ݒ݁ݎݏ݁	݋݂	ܯ݈݈݅ᇱݏ	ݎܽݐ݅݋௜,௧ ൅
∑ ߚ௠ ൈ஼ିଵ௖ୀଵ ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ	݋݂	݋ݎ݅݃݅݊௖ ൅ ∑ ߚ௡ ൈ௒ିଵ௬ୀଵ ܻ݁ܽݎ௬ ൅ ݒ௜,௧       (2) 
 
Variables from (1) and (2) are described as; 
Syndshare is the share of loans syndicated and calculated as the percentage of 
syndicated loans in the bank’s total loans portfolio, including bilateral loans.  
Banks size is proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Capital adequacy is measured by the ratio of Tier 1 capital to total risk-weighted 
assets.  Banks’ loan supply function is directly related to capital constraints.  
Loan portfolio quality is measured by the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans.  
Loan loss provisions can be thought of as a proxy for loan quality, which can 
influence lending policies.    
Liquidity is proxied by the ratio of securities to total assets and signals the 
immediate availability of funds to meet loan demand. Saturation in local business’ 
borrowing activity might lead to additional liquid funds in banks. It may also signal 
the business strategy of the bank in terms of asset diversification.   
NIM - net interest margin is an indicator of a bank’s performance in its primary 
business of financial intermediation. Inability to achieve higher NIM in a given year 
might prompt banks to look for alternative income to boost returns. Syndicated loans 
widen the potential customer range for banks and introduce the possibility of 
reaching borrowers in other markets.  
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Cost efficiency is measured by the cost to income ratio. As noted in James (1987), 
banks have a cost advantage when screening, monitoring and transforming 
information relative to outsiders. Banks’ allocation of funds in loan syndications can 
be thought of as a means of exploiting this cost advantage because these costs are 
generally borne by the arranger banks.  
Income diversification is measured by the ratio of non interest income to total 
income.  The level of non-interest income is an indication of how well a bank is 
diversified in terms of creating alternative income streams. Depending on the terms 
of the loan agreement, participants in a syndicated loan can earn a range of different 
fees10.   
Securitisation is a dummy variable and takes the value of 1 if the bank securitised 
any assets in a given year and 0 otherwise. 
 
Inverse of Mill’s ratio is derived from the first-step of the estimations, country of 
origin and year dummy variables are utilised to control for country and 
macroeconomic effects respectively.  In addition to the variables presented in model 
(2), in alternative specifications we use a dummy variable to proxy for the post 
financial crisis period and capture banks’ behaviour in situations where the screening 
and monitoring of borrowers became imperative for maintaining performance during 
the economic downturn. 
 
 
                                                 
10 For example, they will typically receive a participation fee for agreeing to join the facility, an annual 
commitment or facility fee to compensate for the cost of tying up regulatory capital, and a utilisation 
fee when the funds are drawn by the borrower, etc. 
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3.2 Data 
 
The sample covers the period 2000-2010 and includes information on 4,166 banks of 
which 357 participated in loan syndications during this period. The sample includes 
only participant banks and excludes any arrangers of syndicated loans.  We also 
exclude any participant that acted as an arranger in another loan syndicate.  The 
dataset was constructed by combining data from two different commercial data 
providers: Dealogic Loanware and Thomson One Banker. In constructing the dataset, 
we first identified the banks that lend through syndications and their participation 
amounts were derived from the Loanware database. Subsequently we obtained 
information on the banks’ characteristics from the balance sheets and profit and loss 
accounts contained in the Thomson One Banker. These data resources do not have a 
unique identifier to match the two databases; hence, all of the data was hand-matched 
by a visual inspection of bank names.   
 
Our primary interest is to examine the considerations that motivate commercial banks, 
i.e. banks whose main business is financial intermediation, to choose syndicated 
lending rather than bilateral lending.  Investment banks, which typically act as 
arrangers in syndicated lending were, therefore, excluded from the sample. This 
approach was adopted in an endeavour to redress a weakness in the extant literature, 
which stems from the fact that previous studies (Simons 1993, Dennis and Mullineaux 
2002, Jones et al. 2005, Panyagometh and Roberts 2002, and Altunbaş et al. 2005) 
focus almost exclusively on arranger banks.   
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One reason why the literature focuses on arranger banks relates to the lack of 
information on participant banks.  Loanware database provides information related to 
the share of the loan retained by the arranger but not necessarily by participant banks 
and does not provide shares of each participant banks for all deals11.  It is not clearly 
stated for what percentage of the deals the database provides full information on 
participant shares.  This ratio may depend on the chosen time period.  For the sample 
we collected for this study, we calculated banks’ participation amounts utilising both 
share reporting and non-reporting deals data.  For deals where shares are not reported, 
we calculated each bank’s share by dividing the total loan amount to the number of 
banks participated in the loan.   
 
In Table 1 we detail the features of the data by presenting selected descriptive 
statistics.  In Panel A we report the features of the banks’ loan shares.  The total 
number of loan participations by the banks in our sample is 12,878.  Bank 
participation amount is accurately known for 10,334 of these loan shares, which 
corresponds to approximately 80 percent of the loan share observations.  For 2,544 
loan share observations we estimate the loan share of each bank by dividing the total 
loan amount by the total number of banks in the loan syndicate.   The mean loan share 
amount for the two groups (reported and non-reported loan shares) is 21.2 and 20.1 
million Euro, respectively.  Although the loan participation share is estimated for 
around 20 percent of the loans, we believe this still leads to a relatively accurate way 
of calculating the total funds lend through participating syndicated loans, given the 
limitations of the database.  We observe that on average a bank participated into loan 
                                                 
11 Additionally, compared to the number of arranger banks organizing the syndications, the number of 
participant banks is significantly larger.  Due to the reporting method of Loanware database, it is 
technically a challenging task to identify all the participants in syndications and match these with their 
respective financial indicators. 
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syndications 36.1 times within the ten year period which corresponds to 3.6 times per 
year. 
 
Panel B of Table 1 shows the differences between participant and non participant 
banks by displaying the mean and the median values for a range of selected ratios. 
The t-statistics for the mean comparison tests are also presented in the last column of 
the table. Participant banks account for 8% of the entire sample.   In terms of total 
assets the participant banks are significantly larger than non-participant banks.  
Participant banks are also better capitalised.  We observe a lower loan loss provision 
to total loans ratio for participant banks.  In terms of income, participant banks 
operate with significantly lower net interest margins whereas non participant banks 
have higher non interest income. Additionally, participant banks have lower cost to 
income ratio compared to non participant banks. Banks are more active in the 
securitisation market if they participate in syndicated loans.  Furthermore, participant 
banks are more likely to be listed on a stock exchange.  In Panel C we present the 
distribution of our sample in terms of country of origin and years.  Observations from 
Germany constitute a significant portion of the sample as the banking sector in this 
country is the largest in Europe.  The observations per year are distributed reasonably 
well within the sample period. 
 
4.   Results 
 
At the outset of the analysis we estimate models without the selection equation. The 
results are presented in Table 2.  The models are estimated using OLS and OLS with 
bank specific fixed effects.  We run alternative models utilising all sample as well as 
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only those banks that were active in the syndicated loan market.  As some of these 
banks in the latter group do not participate in loan syndications on a yearly or regular 
basis, it provides us with the opportunity to examine the associated changes which 
occur when their lending behaviour varies throughout the period. 
 
We only interpret the results shown in the last two columns because these models are 
more robust as they control for bank specific fixed effects.  In the penultimate column 
we present the results of estimations for all observations in the sample.  We find that 
banks lend more through loan syndications when they are large and have higher 
capital adequacy ratios. The share of syndicated loans in the loan portfolio also 
increases when banks have higher loan loss provisions and lower net interest margins.  
In the last column we present results for the model with syndication active banks 
only.  The results are similar to the “all observations” except the coefficient of bank 
size loses its significance.   
  
4.1 Main model with selection bias correction 
 
We estimate the main model using the inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR), which is derived 
from the selection model, to correct the possible selection bias.  Results are presented 
in Table 3.  Firstly, we interpret the findings for the selection equation which are 
presented in the first column.   We observe a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient for bank size and loan portfolio quality.  This indicates that larger banks 
and banks with high loan loss provisions are more likely to participate in loan 
syndications.  Larger banks may use syndicated loan markets as an alternative asset 
for an already established, and perhaps saturated, loan portfolio.   More interestingly, 
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it is evident that banks utilise syndicated lending when the quality of the loan 
portfolio deteriorates.  This is related to the fact that the majority of firms borrowing 
on the syndicated loans market are large credit worthy borrowers. Accordingly, banks 
that want to increase the overall quality of their loan portfolios would appear to utilise 
syndicated loans in order to access these low risk customers.  Banks that are active in 
securitisation markets and listed on a stock exchange are also likely to use syndicated 
lending.   
 
Subsequently in Table 3 we present the results of the main model where the 
dependent variable is the ratio of syndicated loans to total loans.  The models are 
estimated using OLS with and without fixed effects and the results of alternative 
specifications, where we include control variables progressively, are shown in five 
models (from columns two to six).  In all specifications, the results shown above 
remain robust even after adjusting for possible selection bias issues.  The findings 
presented in the last column are also more reliable as we utilise all the control 
variables with bank specific fixed effects. Hence, in the discussion below we only 
interpret these results.  
 
We find that asset size is a significant determinant of the share of funds allocated for 
syndicated lending12.   As banks get larger they seek alternative investment 
instruments in order to diversify and grow their asset portfolio. Similarly, as part of 
this process, they also search for potential customers located outside their domestic 
markets.  This suggests that syndicated lending may be used by participant banks as 
an initial “stepping stone” for cross border expansion. Moreover, this typically occurs 
                                                 
12 We also note that the coefficient of this variable changes from negative to positive when we control 
for year and bank specific fixed effects. 
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once the banks have reached a certain size and level of activity in the domestic 
markets.  This explanation is based on the fact that syndicated loans are typically 
extended to large multinational companies. Participation in syndicated loans, 
therefore, may enable banks to become familiar with international lending practices 
and enhances their experience of being associated with international companies.  
 
We find that banks lend more through loan syndicates when they have higher capital 
adequacy.  This is contrary to the findings of Simons (1993), Dennis and Mullineaux 
(2000) and Jones et al. (2000) whose studies found evidence for a significant negative 
relationship.  They found that the capital position of the banks had a significant 
influence on lending decisions and that as capital ratios declined banks were more 
likely to become involved in syndicated lending.  Simons (1993) rationalises this 
finding by arguing that banks, which are constrained by regulatory capital 
considerations might be reluctant to place additional pressure on their balance sheets. 
Rather than engaging in large bilateral lending they spread their exposure by 
syndicating a portion of the loan13. However, these findings are based on evidence 
derived from arranger banks which are typically investment banks. As such, the 
nature of their core business and the structure of their balance sheets are quite 
different compared to the commercial banks that act as participants in syndicated 
lending.  Additionally, unlike the above studies, we utilise a risk weighted capital 
adequacy variable. Accordingly, the findings in this paper support the view that 
participants only become involved in syndicated lending if they have sufficient capital 
to warrant the exposure.  The results also show that banks with high risk adjusted 
                                                 
13 They might also tend to boost their capital adequacy ratios by syndicating part of their existing loan 
portfolios. 
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capital levels allocate more funds to syndicated lending in comparison to bilateral 
lending. Given that in loan syndications participant banks have a relatively distant 
relationship with the borrowers – in comparison to the arranger banks, the findings 
indicate that banks with weaker capital adequacy levels are more likely to prefer 
bilateral lending.  This strategy may avail these banks to be more in control of pre 
lending screening and post lending monitoring of the borrowers.  In other words 
strong levels of regulatory capital increases banks’ capacity to use alternative 
instruments and markets for business14.       
 
The ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans exhibits a positive relationship with the 
level of syndicated lending in the banks’ portfolios.  This finding suggests that banks 
attempt to diversify non-performing bilateral lending portfolios by increasing the 
share of syndicated lending in the overall portfolio.  This may relate to the fact that 
the majority of firms borrowing on the syndicated loans market are large credit 
worthy borrowers. Accordingly, banks that want to increase the overall quality of 
their loan portfolios could utilize syndicated loans in order to access these sorts of 
customers.   
                                                 
14 In relation to the impact of capital adequacy on the choice of syndicated lending, we also tried to 
assess the possible impact of regulatory changes on capital and credit-risk assessment introduced by 
Basel II during the period of the study.  In Europe Basel II was implemented starting from January 
2007. Compared to Basel I, Basel II provided a more risk-sensitive methodology for the measurement 
of regulatory capital which allowed banks to adjust capital more accurately in relation to different 
credit risk levels. Basel II had the potential to make syndicated loans more attractive to borrowers and 
lenders alike.  Given that syndicated loan borrower are less risky, bank could have less spare capital for 
these types of loans.  For example FDIC (2003) suggested that Basel II would lead to a reduction in 
risk-based capital requirements for syndicated loans in the range of 10 to 40 percent.  Such a reduction 
certainly makes funding cheaper for companies in syndicated loan markets. In unreported results, we 
examine the interaction between the year dummy variables (used for control variables) and the relative 
size of the syndicated loan portfolio.  We find that banks were more likely to have larger syndicated 
loan portfolios during the period preceding the financial crisis between 2003 and 2006.  We do not 
detect a significant increase for 2007 and the period after.  It is impossible to conclude that the 
expected impact of Basel II on syndicated lending is not observed because other factors caused by the 
financial crisis had a distressing effect on the European economy and banks. We believe what we 
observe is heavily influence by the dynamics of these extraordinary times.  However, for further 
research, it would be interesting to look at the impact of Basel III regulatory framework on syndicated 
lending once the banking environment returns to normal in Europe.        
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One variable that becomes significant with the selection bias controlled models is 
securities to total assets for which we find a negative relationship with the share of 
syndicated loans in the banks’ loan portfolio.  A larger securities portfolio, which 
would normally incorporate a range of assets, would typically be dominated by 
government bonds and interbank deposits, and would provide the banks with 
additional flexibility and liquidity. A larger securities portfolio could also be 
signalling that participant banks are concentrating less on their traditional business of 
domestic financial intermediation, and diversifying into other assets.   
 
Compared to bilateral loans, syndicated loans have a greater liquidity advantage via 
the secondary syndicated loan market.  Secondary markets provide banks with the 
option to liquidate their syndicated loans and during the 2000s the volume of 
secondary syndicated loan market activity increased greatly.  Our findings supports 
Dennis and Mullineaux (2001) argument that banks’ use syndicated lending as an 
alternative to securities investments to diversify their assets, perhaps for more 
liquidity.  In other words, syndicated lending is seen as a substitute to other liquid 
securities.  A share in a syndicated loan may not be as liquid as a government bond; 
however, it is substantially more liquid than a bilateral loan15.   
 
The analysis indicates a significant negative relationship between net interest margin 
and the level of syndicated lending.  The net interest margin measures how successful 
a bank is in generating income from financial intermediation.  The results suggest that 
                                                 
15 Conversely, in untabulated results, we find a negative relationship between size of loan portfolio and 
the share of syndicated loans in banks’ portfolio.  Proportionally, banks place less of their funds in 
syndicated lending if they have a large loan portfolio.  This finding strengthens our argument that 
syndicated lending is generally more likely to be regarded as an alternative asset to securities than to 
bilateral lending. 
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banks that have high interest margins are less interested in syndicated lending.  On the 
other hand, banks that are not generating enough interest income from their primary 
business might choose syndicated lending in order to increase their level of income. 
Syndicated lending is conducive to achieving this objective because it provides an 
opportunity to acquire exposure to new customers such as those in newly emerged 
markets and alternative industries where higher margins can be achieved.  Banks may 
also prefer syndicated lending because it takes time to penetrate new markets and 
acquire the expertise to lend bilaterally.   
 
We do not find consistently significant coefficients to provide empirical evidence for 
Armstrong’s (2003) cost effectiveness (measured for cost to income ratio) argument.  
Syndicated lending may be a means for extending new loans in a cost effective way 
via the sharing of the administrative and monitoring costs normally associated with 
large scale corporate lending.  However, dependence on arranger banks for propriety 
information about the borrower does introduce the possibility of information 
asymmetries within the syndicate.  In turn, the associated moral hazard problems have 
the potential to introduce additional hidden costs.  Coefficients of non interest income 
to revenue and securitisation are also insignificant.  We also find that the coefficient 
of IMR in OLS models is significant, which signals the need to correct for selection 
bias.  The significance disappears in OLS with FE specification.   
 
4.3   The impact of the financial crisis 
 
To gauge the impact of the financial crisis on banks’ choice of syndicated lending, we 
include a dummy variable proxying the post crisis period into the analysis.  The 
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results are presented in Table 4.  Introducing the variable does not alter the main 
findings discussed above, especially for the most robust model presented in the last 
column.  We find that the coefficient of the post crisis dummy variable is negatively 
and significantly related to syndicated lending activity and the result is consistent in 
all models.  It is evident that banks reduced the share of syndicated lending in their 
loan portfolios after the financial crisis.   
 
Subsequently, we estimate the main model for the post crisis period only and examine 
the changes of bank behaviour towards syndicated lending after the financial crisis.  
The results are presented in Table 5 and reveal that post crisis some of the 
determinants of syndicated lending that we observed above lose their significance. 
Loan loss provisions remains positively related to the share of syndicated lending in 
banks’ loan portfolio.  Accordingly, in the post crisis period syndicated lending 
remained as a viable method of lending to more credible borrowers and as a way of 
diversifying the non-performing loan portfolio with high quality credit.   
 
However, banks with higher capital levels allocated fewer funds to syndicated lending 
in the post crisis era.  This is the opposite of our findings above.  It is plausible that 
banks that maintained higher levels of capital after the crisis faced fewer losses, either 
because of being risk averse or having a diversified loan portfolio.  In addition, these 
banks also decreased their level of post crisis syndicated relative to their share of 
bilateral lending.  This may be reflecting increasing asymmetric information costs 
between participants in the financial markets after the crisis, which lead to more 
conservative bank lending practises.  We also observe that large banks allocate fewer 
funds to syndicated lending and concentrate more on bilateral banking relationships in 
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the post financial crisis period.  This may be a reflection of dropping volumes in the 
syndicated loan market after the crisis and an attempt to reduce risks by nurturing 
closer relationships with borrowers via bilateral lending. 
 
Reduction in syndicated lending may have a number of explanations related to both 
supply and demand side of the market.  Supply side factors may, for example, relate 
to increase in asymmetric information in the financial markets during the crisis.  Loan 
syndicates are particularly prone to this because they have a multi-party structure with 
participant banks relying on arranger banks.  Hence, compared to bilateral loans, 
where a lender only needs to manage information asymmetries related to the 
borrower, another facet of information asymmetries exist between the participant 
banks and arrangers of the syndicate.  During the financial crisis information 
asymmetries, especially in Europe, increased between the market participants in the 
financial markets.  In an uncertain environment banks may, therefore, have reduced 
syndicated lending activity and shifted to bilateral lending where they have more 
control over the information.   
 
Secondly, because borrowers in the syndicated loan markets have a more international 
profile, there is the possibility that the greater uncertainty associated with cross border 
lending made syndicated lending an unattractive choice for banks during the global 
economic slowdown. In other words, banks continued to lend but more to their 
domestic markets16.   
 
                                                 
16 A simple analysis of looking at the size of the loan portfolios of the banks in our sample over time 
shows that banks’ overall loan portfolios in relation to total assets remained at similar levels in the post 
crises period.     
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Looking at the demand side, the reduced importance of syndicated lending in bank 
portfolios might be reflecting the simple fact that activity volume in the global 
syndicated loan market declined, especially in 2008 and 2009, as demand from 
corporations reduced. For example, syndicated loans are particularly preferred for 
financing corporate M&A and project finance transactions due to the considerably 
sizable financing that the market can provide in a single transaction17.    These are two 
corporate activities that soar during an economic upturn and plummet in the periods 
of economic slowdown.    
 
These findings fit well with the current ongoing issues in European banking.  
Navaretti et al. (2010) argues that multinational banks had been growing fast since the 
mid to late 1990s but within the European Union many of these had to be bailed out 
or supported with public funds after the crisis.  Many of these multinational banks 
were using syndicated loan markets to expand their cross-border business.  In fact the 
syndicated loan markets were regarded as a vehicle for the integration of financial 
markets and financial intermediation within Europe.   However, this integration 
process abruptly stalled with the advent of the financial crisis and problems associated 
with a marked loss of confidence in the European banking system (Veron 2012). 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
The paper has investigated the factors that influence European banks when choosing 
between syndicated lending and bilateral lending.  This decision is complicated 
because in syndicated lending participant banks are ostensibly less active than when 
                                                 
17 According to Altunbas et al. (2006) around 27% of the syndicated loans are used for M&A or project 
financing by companies.   
 28
they are involved in bilateral lending and they have an “arm’s length” relationship 
with the borrower.  We also examined the impact of the recent financial crisis on bank 
behaviour in the syndicated loan markets.   
 
We draw several conclusions regarding the choice of syndicated lending by European 
banks.  Firstly, we observed that in Europe larger banks that are more integrated with 
the financial markets, such as those that are listed in stock exchanges or active in the 
securitization markets, and have higher regulatory capital are active in the syndicated 
loan markets.  Secondly, we find that syndicated lending is an inferior alternative to 
bilateral loans when banks are looking for growth or to utilise potential capital.  From 
this perspective, however, syndicated lending is regarded as an alternative 
diversification strategy compared to other more liquid assets.  Thirdly, we find that 
syndicated lending is used by banks to improve the performance of their loan 
portfolios, both in terms of returns and quality.     
 
With regard to the financial crisis, this has had a negative impact on the volume of 
syndicated loans.  Post crisis, European banks, especially larger ones, have reduced 
the share of syndicated lending in their loan portfolios.  Moreover, with the 
continuing uncertainty about European economies, banks with excess capital have 
become more conservative and have placed more emphasis on traditional bilateral 
lending.  Given that syndicated loan markets constitutes one third of all international 
financing in capital markets around the world and provide a vital funding source for 
larger companies in Europe, it is imperative for European policy makers to examine 
the factors that led to this fall in appetite for syndicated loans.  It is difficult to exactly 
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pinpoint the reasons behind this fall due to the ongoing restructuring of the banking 
sector and financial markets.  
 
From a policy perspective alternative explanations may have different implications. If 
the reduction is a supply side phenomenon stemming from increased information 
asymmetries between banks, leading to more conservative lending practices, then 
restoring confidence to the financial system may reverse this trend.  If syndicated 
lending became less attractive due to its cross border nature then the drop in 
syndicated lending may be an outcome of conservative lending to domestic markets 
during the uncertain economic environment between 2007 and 2010.  The drop in 
volume may also be an early sign of national regulatory policies where more domestic 
lending is encouraged.  Hence, policy makers seem to be achieving targets if this is 
the case.    
 
Still another factor may be the efforts to develop a regulatory approach on an 
international scale, outlined in Basel III framework, to minimize the effects of 
interconnectedness among systemically important banks, which transmitted shocks 
across the financial systems and economies in the crisis.  Given the international 
nature of syndicated loans, inevitably, such regulatory policies may have an effect on 
the supply side of the syndicated loan market.  It is still too early to assess the impact 
of such regulation on syndicated lending; however, for further research, it would be 
interesting to look at the impact of Basel III regulatory framework on syndicated loan 
markets.  If the drop in loan volumes is more associated with the demand side then the 
market should lift up once more economic growth is observed in Europe. 
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Descriptive Statistics
Panel A
Description
Panel B
Means 
comparison
Variables Mean Median St. dev. Min Max Mean Median St. dev. Min Max P-value
Total assets (million Euro) 50378 8012 130751 108 931335 5573 1657 35484 93 436446 0.000
Tier 1 capital to total risk-weighted assets 7.73 7.37 3.07 1.19 17.24 6.81 5.95 2.92 -0.47 16.11 0.000
Loan loss provisions to total loans 0.74 0.51 0.58 0.00 3.72 0.84 0.65 0.67 0.00 4.68 0.000
Securities to total assets 32.84 29.12 30.64 0.34 62.34 33.31 31.82 34.61 0.00 71.63 0.555
Net interest margin 2.12 2.13 0.81 -0.01 3.69 2.69 2.67 0.76 -1.87 4.87 0.000
Cost to income ratio 61.50 61.40 14.12 5.91 86.82 69.21 69.51 12.95 2.10 117.26 0.000
Non-interest income to revenue 1.98 1.59 1.76 -2.83 8.67 4.45 2.73 4.94 -4.83 46.87 0.000
Securitisation active 0.07 0.00 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 0.000
Listed in the stock exchange 0.12 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.00 1.00 0.000
Syndicated loans to total loans 0.023 0.016 0.035 0.001 0.272
Number of observations 1998 24301
Number of banks 357 3809
Panel C
Country of origin
Austria 2000 2,113
Belgium 2001 2,024
Denmark 2002 1,927
Finland 2003 1,796
France 2004 1,831
Germany 2005 2,013
Greece 2006 2,885
Ireland 2007 2,982
Italy 2008 3,003
Luxembourg 2009 2,864
Netherlands 2010 2,861
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
Total
Minimun loan share amount (million Euro) 1.0 1.0 1.0
Maximum loan share amount (million Euro) 78.5 114.4 114.4
Median loan share amount (million Euro) 12.1 8.7 11.4
Mean number of syndicated loan participations per bank per year 2.9 0.7 3.6
Mean loan share amount (million Euro) 21.2 20.1 20.7
Standard deviation of loan share amount 18.9 23.8 21.4
Loan share 
reported
Loan share not 
reported Total
Number of syndicated laon participations 10334 2544 12878
Mean number of syndicated loan participations per bank 28.9 7.1 36.1
Yearly frequency of 
observations
Table 1
Panel A displays descriptive statistics and information on banks' share on syndicated loan participations. Panel B reports mean, median, standard deviation,
minimum and maximum value of financial features of syndicated loan participant and non-participant banks between 2000 and 2010. T-statistics for mean
comparison tests are presented in the last column. Panel C displays the distribution of observations per country and year.
Syndicated loan participants Non-participants
13
71
2
28
208
344
49
16
323
102
38
109
87
Number of 
banks
245
305
1,938
15
9
357
Number of 
observations
168
56
67
25
39
9
3
72
23
12
Number of 
banks
24
10
9
5
37
68
57
378
7
130
1998
Non-participantsSyndicated loan participants
20
2,574
249
180
126
422
182
Number of 
observations
1,718
177
557
46
1,695
15,012
61
607
62
49
49
100
14
525
939
243013809
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Table 2
             
Determinants of share of syndicated loans in banks' loan portfolio           
This table presents coefficient estimates for OLS regressions on the share of syndicated loans in banks' loan portfolios.  Dependent variable 
equals to the amount of syndicated loans in bank's portfolio divided by total loans. Bank size is measured by size log of total assets. Capital 
adequacy is measured by Tier 1 capital to total risk-weighted assets.  Loan portfolio quality is measured by the ratio of loan loss provisions 
to loans.  Liquidity is measured by securities to total assets. Net interest margin is the difference between interest income and interest 
expense divided by average earning assets.  Cost efficiency is measured by cost to income ratio.  Securitisation takes the value of 1 if the 
bank is active in the securitization market and 0 otherwise. Listed bank is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the bank is listed at a 
stock exchange and 0 otherwise.  We control for macroeconomic environment with dummy variables for years between 2001 and 2010. 
Country of origin is controlled for with a set of dummy variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  ***, ** and * 
represents significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Lagged variables (t-1) are denoted with ‡. 
  OLS  OLS with FE
  All sample  
Syndication active 
banks  All sample
Syndication active 
banks
  Coeff. Std. err.  Coeff. Std. err.  Coeff. Std. err.  Coeff. Std. err. 
Log total assets‡  0.001 0.000  0.004 0.001***  0.001 0.000*  0.003 0.001
Tier 1 capital to total risk-weighted assets‡ 0.023 0.002***  0.259 0.003***  0.055 0.006***  0.455 0.061***
Loan loss provisions to total loans‡ 0.089 0.015***  1.111 0.019***  0.089 0.013***  1.166 0.175***
Securities to total assets‡ 0.000 0.003  -0.116 0.018  -0.005 0.003  -0.108 0.041
Net interest margin‡ -0.001 0.000***  -0.013 0.045***  -0.001 0.000***  -0.020 0.004***
Cost to income ratio‡ -0.001 0.001*  -0.005 0.001  0.000 0.001  -0.018 0.012
Non interest income to revenue‡ -0.031 0.001  0.025 0.006  0.000 0.001  -0.001 0.005
Securitisation active 0.006 0.002***  0.006 0.001  -0.002 0.002  -0.002 0.009
Constant 0.003 0.004  0.135 0.062  -0.004 0.006  0.070 0.077
              
Control variables             
    Country of origin Yes   Yes         
    Year Yes   Yes    Yes   Yes  
              
R-square 0.02   0.14    0.01   0.09  
F-test (p-values) 0.00   0.00    0.00   0.00  
Number of observations 26,299   1,998    26,299   1,998  
Number of groups        4,166   357  
 
  
 37 
Table 3                      
 
Determinants of share of syndicated loans in banks' loan portfolio with sample selection correction  
This table presents coefficient estimates for OLS regressions on the share of syndicated loans in banks' loan portfolios. The first column reports the estimates for the selection equation and the dependent 
variable takes the value of 1 if the bank participates to loan syndication for the specified year and 0 otherwise. In other columns the dependent variable equals to the amount of syndicated loans in bank's 
portfolio divided by total loans.  Bank size is measured by size log of total assets.  Capital adequacy is measured by Tier 1 capital to total risk-weighted assets.  Loan portfolio quality is measured by the ratio 
of loan loss provisions to loans.  Liquidity is measured by securities to total assets. Net interest margin is the difference between interest income and interest expense divided by average earning assets.  Cost 
efficiency is measured by cost to income ratio.  Securitisation takes the value of 1 if the bank is active in the securitization market and 0 otherwise. Listed bank is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the 
bank is listed at a stock exchange and 0 otherwise.  We control for macroeconomic environment with dummy variables for years between 2001 and 2010. Country of origin is controlled for with a set of 
dummy variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  ***, ** and * represents significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Lagged variables (t-1) are denoted with ‡. 
  Selection equation   OLS   OLS with FE 
  Coeff. Std. err.    Coeff. Std. err.    Coeff. Std. err.    Coeff. Std. err.    Coeff. Std. err.    Coeff. Std. err.  
Log total assets‡  0.353 0.012***   0.013 0.002***   0.011 0.003***   0.009 0.003***   0.006 0.006***   0.006 0.007*** 
Tier 1 capital to total risk-weighted assets‡       0.203 0.026***   0.248 0.027***   0.249 0.027***   0.342 0.053***   0.380 0.054*** 
Loan loss provisions to total loans‡ 4.540 1.535***   0.932 0.178***   0.963 0.179***   1.093 0.186***   1.107 0.169***   1.197 0.176*** 
Securities to total assets‡ -0.154 0.389   -0.134 0.041***   -0.122 0.041***   -0.105 0.044**   -0.151 0.038***   -0.137 0.043*** 
Net interest margin‡       -0.016 0.002***   -0.013 0.002***   -0.013 0.002***   -0.016 0.004***   -0.018 0.004*** 
Cost to income ratio‡       -0.017 0.008*   -0.007 0.009   -0.006 0.009   -0.019 0.012*   -0.017 0.012 
Non interest income to revenue‡       -0.001 0.006   0.000 0.006   0.000 0.006   -0.001 0.005   -0.001 0.005 
Securitisation active 0.561 0.120***   -0.012 0.012   -0.018 0.012   -0.012 0.012   0.028 0.022   0.014 0.022 
Listed in the stock exchange 0.218 0.076***   0.001 0.007   0.000 0.007   0.001 0.007             
Inverse Mill's ratio       -0.120 0.056**   -0.141 0.056**   -0.105 0.056**   0.185 0.120   0.098 0.123 
Constant -3.900 0.429***   0.362 0.072***   0.362 0.071***   0.245 0.074***   0.074 0.555   -0.091 0.132 
                                    
Control variables Yes                                 
    Country of origin Yes     No     Yes     Yes               
    Year       No     No     Yes     No     Yes   
                                    
R-square 0.43     0.11     0.13     0.14     0.08     0.09   
F-test (p-values) 0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00   
Number of observations 26,126     1,998     1,998     1,998     1,998     1,998   
Number of groups                         357     357   
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Table 4             
 
The impact of the financial crises on the choice of syndicated lending 
This table presents coefficient estimates for OLS regressions on the share of syndicated loans in banks' loan portfolios.  Dependent variable equals to the amount of 
syndicated loans in bank's portfolio divided by total loans.  Bank size is measured by size log of total assets.  Capital adequacy is measured by Tier 1 capital to total risk-
weighted assets.  Loan portfolio quality is measured by the ratio of loan loss provisions to loans.  Liquidity is measured by securities to total assets. Net interest margin is 
the difference between interest income and interest expense divided by average earning assets.  Cost efficiency is measured by cost to income ratio.  Securitisation takes 
the value of 1 if the bank is active in the securitization market and 0 otherwise. Listed bank is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the bank is listed at a stock 
exchange and 0 otherwise.  Post crisis period takes the value of 1 for the years between 2008 and 2010 and 0 otherwise. We control for macroeconomic environment with 
dummy variables for years between 2001 and 2010. Country of origin is controlled for with a set of dummy variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  
***, ** and * represents significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Lagged variables (t-1) are denoted with ‡.
   OLS  OLS with FE 
  Coeff. Std. err.  Coeff. Std. err.  Coeff. Std. err.  Coeff. Std. err.  
Log total assets‡  0.005 0.001***  0.010 0.003***  0.001 0.005  0.002 0.006 
Tier 1 capital to total risk-weighted assets‡ 0.253 0.027***  0.243 0.027***  0.343 0.053***  0.345 0.053*** 
Loan loss provisions to total loans‡ 1.081 0.181***  1.064 0.181***  1.152 0.169***  1.159 0.169*** 
Securities to total assets‡ -0.146 0.040***  -0.136 0.041***  -0.130 0.036***  -0.140 0.039*** 
Net interest margin‡ -0.013 0.002***  -0.013 0.002***  -0.016 0.004***  -0.016 0.004*** 
Cost to income ratio‡ -0.007 0.009  -0.007 0.009  -0.017 0.012  -0.016 0.012 
Non interest income to revenue‡ 0.000 0.006  -0.001 0.006  -0.001 0.005  -0.001 0.005 
Securitisation active 0.007 0.007  -0.016 0.012  -0.002 0.009  0.014 0.022 
Post crisis period -0.013 0.004***  -0.012 0.004***  -0.013 0.004***  -0.012 0.004*** 
Inverse Mill's ratio    -0.111 0.056**     0.097 0.122 
Constant 0.189 0.044***  0.305 0.073***  0.136 0.065**  0.050 0.126 
              
Control variables             
    Country of origin Yes   Yes         
              
R-square 0.13   0.14   0.08   0.08   
F-test (p-values) 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
Number of observations 1,998   1,998   1,998   1,998   
Number of groups       357   357   
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Table 5           
 
Determinants of share of syndicated loans in banks' loan portfolio post financial crisis      
This table presents coefficient estimates for OLS regressions on the share of syndicated loans in banks' loan 
portfolios.  Dependent variable equals to the amount of syndicated loans in bank's portfolio divided by total loans.  
Bank size is measured by size log of total assets.  Capital adequacy is measured by Tier 1 capital to total risk-
weighted assets.  Loan portfolio quality is measured by the ratio of loan loss provisions to loans.  Liquidity is 
measured by securities to total assets. Net interest margin is the difference between interest income and interest 
expense divided by average earning assets.  Cost efficiency is measured by cost to income ratio.  Securitisation 
takes the value of 1 if the bank is active in the securitization market and 0 otherwise. Listed bank is a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if the bank is listed at a stock exchange and 0 otherwise.  We control for 
macroeconomic environment with dummy variables for years between 2001 and 2010. Country of origin is 
controlled for with a set of dummy variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  ***, ** and * 
represents significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Lagged variables (t-1) are denoted with ‡.
  OLS   OLS with FE
  Coeff. Std. err.  Coeff. Std. err.    Coeff. Std. err. 
Log total assets‡  -0.003 0.001***  -0.008 0.003***   -0.029 0.014**
Tier 1 capital to total risk-weighted assets‡ 0.021 0.026  0.010 0.027   -0.123 0.063*
Loan loss provisions to total loans‡ 0.450 0.131***  0.441 0.131***   0.263 0.139*
Securities to total assets‡ 0.024 0.039  0.035 0.040   0.016 0.059
Net interest margin‡ -0.001 0.002  -0.001 0.002   -0.004 0.003
Cost to income ratio‡ 0.000 0.007  0.000 0.007   -0.004 0.008
Non interest income to revenue‡ 0.000 0.003  0.000 0.003   -0.001 0.003
Securitisation active 0.005 0.005  -0.008 0.009   -0.018 0.030
Inverse Mill's ratio    -0.080 0.046*   -0.120 0.173
Constant 0.027 0.041  0.112 0.064*   0.496 0.216**
            
Control variables           
    Country of origin Yes   Yes      
            
R-square 0.10   0.10    0.03  
F-test (p-values) 0.00   0.00    0.00  
Number of observations 845   845    845  
Number of groups              308  
 
